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UNTANGLING THE WORLD WIDE WEBLOG:  
A PROPOSAL FOR BLOGGING, 
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL, AND LIFESTYLE 
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Laws are like spider’s webs:  if some poor weak creature 
come[s] up against them, it is caught; but a bigger one can 
break through and get away.1 
Imagine landing your dream job.  All of your hard work and 
education has finally paid off.  You accept the job offer, give two weeks’ 
notice at your current place of employment, and move to another state to 
start your dream job.  Being far from home, and wanting to keep in touch 
with family and friends scattered around the country, you start up a 
blog.  You plan to use your blog to allow your family and friends to read 
a daily account of your life as you start your new job and begin setting 
up your new apartment.  Within two weeks of starting your dream job, 
you are fired and unemployed.  Unfortunately, this is the true story of 
Mark Jen, the computer engineer who lost his dream job at Google 
within two weeks of starting, because of his blog.2   
Now consider the tragedy of losing a loved one in your life.  You are 
depressed, numb, and unable to express your feelings to a therapist.  
You decide to start a blog as a form of therapy, because you think it may 
be easier to write about your heartache than to talk about it.  Your online 
diary allows you to share your thoughts and feelings, and helps you 
through the tough times.  You return home one day to find an urgent 
message from your employer on your answering machine requesting a 
call back.  During the discussion, you learn that your employer is firing 
you because of pictures you posted on your blog.  To your surprise, you 
have lost your job after giving the company eight years of faithful service 
with no prior employment discipline.  For Ellen Simonetti, better known 
as Queen of the Sky, this scenario is the true account of what happened 
when Delta Airlines fired her because of her blog, Diary of a Flight 
Attendant.3   
                                                 
1 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 512 (5th ed. 1999) (quoting Solon). 
2 See Mark Jen, The Official Story, Straight From the Source (Feb. 11, 2005, 9:35 a.m.), 
http://blog.plaxoed.com/?p=27 (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (describing the events leading 
up to his termination from Google). 
3 See Ellen Simonetti, Perspective: I Was Fired For Blogging, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 
2004.  Ellen Simonetti was fired because some of her pictures were in uniform; however, 
Ms. Simonetti filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming 
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After reading about the firings of employee bloggers Mark Jen and 
Ellen Simonetti, you now know what it means to be dooced.4  Being 
dooced refers to an employer’s termination of an employee because of 
the employee’s blog postings.5  In recent years, many employees have 
found out the hard way that their “clever little blog” can get them fired.6   
Dooced employees have created a media frenzy, leaving 
employment lawyers scrambling to advise corporate clients on how to 
effectively and legally address employee blogging both proactively and 
retroactively.7  Furthermore, blogging employees are wondering what 
their rights are, if any, to engage in lawful off-duty blogging activities.8  
                                                                                                             
that numerous male Delta employees had pictures posted on the internet in uniform for 
which they were not punished.  Id.  Additionally, Ms. Simonetti filed a lawsuit in federal 
court alleging, inter alia, discrimination based on sex “pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964 and 1991.”  Complaint at *1, Simonetti v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2321, 2005 
WL 2897844 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2005), dismissed without prejudice, No. 1:05-CV-2321 (Oct. 28, 
2005) (dismissing action pending order by the bankruptcy court lifting the stay due to 
Delta’s bankruptcy filing). 
4 See Heather Armstrong, About This Site, http://www.dooce.com/about.html (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2007) (giving a chronological account of Heather Armstrong’s blogging 
experience beginning in February 2001 through her firing in February 2002, to how she is 
currently making use of her blog). 
5 See Armstong, supra note 4 (describing the history of Ms. Armstrong’s blog).  Ms. 
Armstrong coined the word “dooced,” which derived from her workplace nickname, 
“dooce.”  Id.  Armstong also named her blog Dooce.  Id.  Armstrong was fired for her blog 
postings on dooce.com, which subsequently led to the term “dooced” being used to refer to 
bloggers who have been fired for their online blog postings.  Id. 
6 Stephanie Armour, Warning: Your Clever Little Blog Could Get You Fired, USA TODAY, 
June 15, 2005, at 1B (telling the stories of several employees who were fired for blogging). 
7 Armour, supra note 6, at 1B; see, e.g., Kenneth Ebanks et al., Blogs Pose New Legal Issues 
and Potential Liability for Corporate America, COVINGTON & BURLING, Apr. 14, 2005, http:// 
www.cov.com/files/Publication/95294ee2-4c37-4d24-9f6a-ccaca7f7debb/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/a5acd981-b292-4bac-9e23-d749027925f0/oid57967.pdf; Kenneth 
Ebanks et al., Employee Blogging, COVINGTON & BURLING, Apr. 18, 2005, http://www.cov. 
com/files/Publication/8f1fe39d-4de9-46c4-9003-e75b7c277a1f/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/15431acd-319c-41ce-b22e-ea7f0f70b0e2/oid57969.pdf.  Blogs pose company 
liability concerns for: 
defamation, copyright and trademark infringement, disclosure of trade 
secrets or private consumer information, and other business torts.  
Even comments posted to a blog by unrelated third parties might give 
rise to claims of corporate liability.  And any corporation that 
distributes a blog everywhere the Internet reaches . . . should be 
cognizant of the profound implications for legal liability relating to 
personal jurisdiction and governing law. 
Ebanks et al., Blogs Pose New Legal Issues and Potential Liability for Corporate America, supra. 
8 Amour, supra note 6, at 1B.  From the start, it is important to establish that this Note is 
confined at addressing only blogging that takes place away from the workplace and off-
duty.  The applicable legal consequences and policies are different for on-duty blogging 
and are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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To make matters worse, there are conflicts within employment law 
jurisprudence applicable to the blogging phenomenon, particularly with 
the policies of the employment-at-will doctrine and lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that protect lawful off-duty activities.9  The 
judicially created public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine do not necessarily provide protection for an employee’s off-
duty blogging activities.10  Existing lifestyle discrimination statutes leave 
loopholes where not all aspects of blogging are protected; thus, at-will 
employee bloggers seeking protection for their blogging activities must 
turn to their state legislatures to either enact or amend existing lifestyle 
discrimination statutes to protect lawful off-duty blogging activities and 
the speech associated with the blog in furtherance of the public policies 
behind lifestyle discrimination statutes.11  Statutory legislation is the 
answer to give at-will employee bloggers certainty as to their right to 
blog while away from work, because neither the currently enacted 
lifestyle discrimination statutes nor the judicially enforced public policy 
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine adequately protect lawful 
off-duty activities, such as blogging and the speech that is associated 
with those blogging activities.12  Certainty as to employees’ rights while 
engaging in lawful off-duty activities, particularly while blogging, is 
needed to protect employees from surprise firings from places of 
employment that do not already have clearly communicated blogging 
policies.13   
First, this Note discusses the history of blogging and its place in 
employment law.14  Second, this Note analyzes the adequacy of current 
employment law jurisprudence in addressing blogging and the 
employment relationship and discusses the need to protect at-will 
                                                 
9 See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing blogging in the context of judicial and legislative 
employment law). 
10 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine and their potential applicability to bloggers). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 166-171 (illustrating several policy grounds for 
providing comprehensive legislative protection for at-will employee bloggers through 
lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
12 See infra Parts III.A-B (analyzing the need for legislative action to protect blogging and 
the online speech associated with blogging). 
13 See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (identifying blog-related firings).  For 
examples of employers with clearly communicated blogging policies, see infra note 58.  See 
also infra notes 166-71 (providing policy reasons for lifestyle discrimination statutes’ 
protection of bloggers). 
14 See infra Part II.  This Part discusses the general history of blogging.  Id.  This Part also 
explains and examines judicial and legislative employment law.  Id. 
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employee blogger’s speech.15  Third, this Note proposes a model 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute to protect at-will 
employee bloggers in an effort to further the public policies behind 
lifestyle discrimination statutes.16  
II.  BACKGROUND 
With each new headline reporting another story of a dooced 
employee, mounting tension continues to fester between employers and 
employees, each seeking answers about legal rights.17  Likewise, courts 
are searching for answers to the novel legal questions blogs present to 
employment law jurisprudence.18  Despite the legal issues blogs raise, 
the popularity of blogging has not decreased.19  The roots of the legal 
issues surrounding the blogging culture begin with the history of the 
laws in conflict.20   
First, this Part explains the general history of blogging, sets out the 
generally applicable legal principles related to blogging, and explains 
how blogging has made its way into employment relationships.21  
Second, this Part discusses blogging in the context of judicially created 
employment law, particularly, the employment-at-will doctrine.22  
Finally, this Part discusses blogging in the context of legislatively created 
employment laws, specifically lifestyle discrimination statutes.23   
                                                 
15 See infra Part III.  This Part explains why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be 
protected, and why the legislature is the best place for protection.  Id.  Additionally, this 
Part analyzes the various shortcomings of the employment-at-will public policy exceptions 
and the loopholes in the current lifestyle discrimination statutes as applied to bloggers.  Id. 
16 See infra Part IV.  The author proposes a model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination 
statute that would protect at-will employee bloggers’ lawful off-duty blogging activities 
and the speech that necessarily accompanies blogging.  Id. 
17 See Paul S. Gutman, Note, Say What?: Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145, 147 (2003). 
18 Henry Hoang Pham, Bloggers and the Workplace: The Search for a Legal Solution to the 
Conflict Between Employee Blogging and Employers, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 207, 210 (2006). 
19 See Elizabeth R. Rita & Eric D. Gunning, Navigating the Blogosphere in the Workplace, 
COLO. LAW., May 2006, at 55 (attributing the growth of blogging partly to the creation of 
user-friendly software that makes the setup and maintenance of blogs simple for even 
below-average computer users); Gutman, supra note 17, at 146-47 (identifying several user-
friendly, web-based blog software options).  The software enables users to set up a blog in 
less than five minutes. Gutman, supra note 17, at 146-47.  “Because these applications are 
available from any computer with World Wide Web access, one does not have to own a 
computer to speak online.  Only access is needed.”  Id. 
20 See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing the history of blogging). 
21 See infra Part II.A (discussing the blogging and its emergence within the law). 
22 See infra Part II.B (examining blogging and the employment-at-will doctrine). 
23 See infra Part II.C (explaining the current types of lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
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A. The Emergence of Blogs:  From the World Wide Web to a Web of Legal 
Issues  
Blogging is a relatively new phenomenon that has found popularity 
among a wide variety of age groups and professions.24  Recently, 
blogging has also emerged in employment law, where it is creating a 
host of new legal controversies.25  This Section offers a history of 
blogging and its emergence in the law.26  This Section also gives a brief 
overview of general legal principles applicable to blogging.27  Finally, 
this Section explains how blogging has appeared in the employment 
relationship.28   
1. History of Blogging  
Historically, internet users created weblogs as a way to help other 
internet users bypass traditional search engines, cut down on search 
time, and provide commentary about useful websites in one convenient 
place.29  The function of a weblog, now commonly referred to as a blog, 
has changed significantly in recent years into a pop culture phenomenon 
used for computer-mediated communications that enable online 
socializing.30  Blogs now host a wide assortment of information ranging 
                                                 
24 See supra note 19 (discussing the how the growth of blogging has been propounded by 
recent technological developments). 
25 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing a general overview of blogging and its place in the 
law). 
26 See infra Part II.A.1. 
27 See infra Part II.A.2. 
28 See infra Part II.A.3. 
29 Gutman, supra note 17, at 145.  Gutman explains that the need for expediting the 
search process stemmed from the days when high-speed internet access was rare and most 
dial-up internet connections charged an hourly fee.  Id.  See generally Rebecca Blood, 
Weblogs: A History and Perspective, REBECCA’S POCKET, Sept. 7, 2000, http://www.rebecca 
blood.net/essays/weblog_history.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing the origin of 
the term “weblog” and its beginning use as a filtering system in which the web has been 
“pre-surfed” in order to direct users to particularly useful websites); Wikipedia, Blog, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (reporting the chronological 
history of blogging beginning in 1994 through the present). 
30 SUSAN C. HERRING ET AL., CONVERSATIONS IN THE BLOGOSPHERE: AN ANALYSIS “FROM 
THE BOTTOM UP” 1 (2005), available at http://www.blogninja.com/hicss05.blogconv.pdf.  
Other common computer-mediated communications that promote online socializing 
include email and instant messaging.  Id. at 1 n.1.  See also AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH 
FOX, BLOGGERS: A PORTRAIT OF THE INTERNET’S NEW STORYTELLERS 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP%20Bloggers%20Report%20July%2019%202006.pd
f.  Bloggers regularly use technology as a way of socializing.  LENHART & FOX, supra.  
Research identifies bloggers as: 
among the most enthusiastic communicators of the modern age, taking 
advantage of nearly every opportunity to communicate.  Seventy-eight 
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from daily life experiences, politics, and government, to sports and 
entertainment, making an exact definition debatable and incomplete.31  
Moreover, blog popularity and growth has lead to the development of 
commonplace online blog language and definitions.32  With thousands of 
                                                                                                             
percent of bloggers say they send or receive instant messages.  By 
comparison, 38% of all internet users send and receive instant 
messages.  Again, bloggers outstrip their high-speed counterparts (40% 
of home broadband users IM) and even internet users between 18 and 
29 years old (54% of whom IM).  Fifty-five percent of bloggers say they 
send or receive text messages using a cell phone, compared with 40% 
of home broadband users and 60% of younger internet users. 
Id.  Contra Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers’ Privacy, 66 LA. L. 
REV. 1079, 1081 (2006) (asserting that September 11, 2001, and the Iraq war have changed 
blogs from “blurts about the writer’s day” into a new form of communication).  “[D]uring 
the crisis, the market for serious news commentary soared. . . .  [P]eople were not just 
hungry for news, . . . [people] were hungry for communication, for checking their gut 
against someone they had come to know, for emotional support and psychological 
bonding.”  Id. at 1081-82. 
31 David L. Hudson, Jr., Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 NEXUS 129, 129 (2006); 
LENHART & FOX, supra note 30, at 1. 
The Pew Internet Project blogger survey finds that the American 
blogosphere is dominated by those who use their blogs as personal 
journals.  Most bloggers do not think of what they do as journalism. 
 Most bloggers say they cover a lot of different topics, but when 
asked to choose one main topic, 37% of bloggers cite “my life and 
experiences” as a primary topic of their blog.  Politics and government 
ran a very distant second with 11% of bloggers citing those issues of 
public life as the main subject of their blog. 
 Entertainment-related topics were the next most popular blog-
type, with 7% of bloggers, followed by sports (6%), general news and 
current events (5%), business (5%), technology (4%), religion, 
spirituality or faith (2%), a specific hobby or a health problem or illness 
(each comprising 1% of bloggers).  Other topics mentioned include 
opinions, volunteering, education, photography, causes and passions, 
and organizations. 
LENHART & FOX, supra note 30, at ii; cf. Merriam-Webster Online, Blog, 
http://www.webster.com/dictionary/blog (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (defining a blog as “a 
Web site that contains an online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often 
hyperlinks provided by the writer”).  But see HERRING ET AL., supra note 30, at 1 (pointing 
out that some authors are of the opinion that a blog must be linked to other blogs in order 
to be defined as a blog). 
32 See Merriam-Webster Online, Merriam-Webster Announces 2004 Words, 
http://www.m-w.com/info/pr/2004-words-of-year.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2007) 
(announcing “blog” as the 2004 word of the year based on online lookups).  Some blogging 
websites provide links to dictionary-like compilations that define blogging terms to keep 
bloggers informed of current blogging vocabulary.  See, e.g., Pointblog.com, What’s A Blog?, 
in HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 7-8 (2005), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/ 
pdf/Bloggers_Handbook2.pdf.  Examples of commonly used blogging terms include: 
BLOG 
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blogs created daily, and millions of others maintained, questions about 
what legal issues blogs present inevitably have followed as blogging 
makes its way from the World Wide Web to the courthouse.33  Such 
courthouse folly raises many legal issues, including First Amendment 
speech protections.34  
2. General Overview of Blogging and the Law   
The United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
is definite in its protection of anonymous speech as well as its extension 
to anonymous internet speech.35  First Amendment speech protection is 
                                                                                                             
Short for Weblog. A website that contains written material, links or 
photos being posted all the time, usually by one individual, on a 
personal basis. 
(TO) BLOG 
Run a blog or post material on one. 
BLOGGER 
Person who runs a blog. 
BLOGOSPHERE 
All blogs, or the blogging community. 
BLOGROLL 
List of external links appearing on a blog, often links to other blogs and 
usually in a column on the homepage. Often amounts to a “sub-
community” of bloggers who are friends. 
BLOGWARE 
Software used to run a blog. 
Id. 
33 See William H. Floyd III & James T. Hedgepath, The Electronic Workplace, S.C. LAW., 
May 2006, at 38; Jennifer L. Peterson, The Shifting Legal Landscape of Blogging, WIS. LAW., 
Mar. 2006, at 8; Rita &. Gunning, supra note 19, at 55. 
34 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing blogging and some applicable general legal principles).  
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause proscribes the government from 
interfering with this right, declaring that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech. . . “  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Employees find it surprising that the First 
Amendment only limits government action, and fails to protect employees working in the 
private sector or to restrict private employers’ behavior.  For a discussion of First 
Amendment rights and the non-applicability to private sector employees, see Patrick D. 
Robben, Protecting the Anonymity of Bloggers and Blog Sources: Evolving Case Law Applies Old 
Principles to New Technology, 10 J. INTERNET LAW NO. 4, 1 (2006). 
35 McIntyre v. Oh. Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (referring to the interest in 
advancing of the marketplace of ideas as outweighing the public’s interest of identity 
disclosure).  In McIntyre, the Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the Ohio Code, which 
prohibited the distribution of campaign literature without the name and address of the 
individual distributing the literature.  Id. at 357.  “Accordingly, an author’s decision to 
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of 
a publication, is an aspect of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 
342.  The Court identified one of the purposes of anonymous speech as avoiding fear of 
official or economic retaliation and bias.  Id.  The Court analogized this purpose with the 
practice of grading law school exams “blindly” in that the law professor does not know the 
identity of the writer while grading the paper.  Id. at n.5. 
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not triggered, however, for certain low value speech categories such as 
obscenity,36 fighting words,37 and defamation.38  While the First 
Amendment protects freedom of speech, anonymous speech, and 
internet speech, there has yet to be a decision as to whether bloggers’ 
online speech is protected within any of the aforementioned categories.39   
                                                                                                             
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy 
and of dissent.  Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority. . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, 
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular 
individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the 
hand of an intolerant society.  The right to remain anonymous may be 
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. 
Id. at 357; Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (invalidating a 
Colorado law that required initiative-petition circulators to wear an identification badge 
stating their names).  The Supreme Court in Buckley relied on McIntyre in invalidating the 
law on First Amendment grounds.  Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199.  See also, Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  The Supreme Court recognized the Internet as “a unique medium—
known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical location but 
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”  Id. at 851.  
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier 
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”  Id. at 870; Doe v. 
2TheMart.Com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (noting that “Internet 
anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas”); Doe v. Cahill, 
884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (“Anonymous internet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some 
instances can become the modern equivalent of political pamphleteering.”). 
36 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973).  In Miller, the Court enumerated an obscenity test that is still used today.  ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 985 (2d ed. 2002). 
The Court said that ‘‘the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards’ would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.’’ 
Id. 
37 Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  The Court defined fighting words 
as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace.”  Id. at 572.  The Chaplinski Court held that fighting words include calling 
someone a “damn Fascist.”  Id. at 574.  “The Supreme Court never has overturned 
Chaplinski; fighting words remain a category of speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  But in more than half a century since Chaplinski, the Court has never again 
upheld a fighting words conviction.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 968. 
38 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (holding public officials must 
show by clear and convincing evidence the falsity of the defamatory statement, and actual 
malice to recover in a defamation case). 
39 Julie China, Blogger’s Anonymous, FED. LAW., Mar. 2006, at 6. 
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When the anonymity protections of the First Amendment are 
invoked in a tort action, the issues must be resolved by balancing the 
benefits of secrecy versus the need for disclosure.40  For bloggers, the 
anonymity protections of the First Amendment are most likely to be 
invoked by those that blog using a screen name or other pseudonym.41  
A clash exists between the anonymous speech that the First Amendment 
protects and the necessity of disclosure in defamation suits.42   
The tort of defamation requires, at minimum, a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another, an unprivileged publication to a third 
party, fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, 
and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or 
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.43  Recently, 
courts have seen a rise in the number of defamation suits filed by 
plaintiffs who claim defamation perpetrated by an anonymous online 
speaker.44   
The law is currently unsettled as to when and under what 
circumstances courts will compel disclosure of a blogger’s identity in a 
defamation proceeding.45  Courts must exercise discretion and caution 
when identifying anonymous speakers because of the growing threat to 
First Amendment freedom of anonymous speech.46  Essentially, courts 
must determine the scope of a blogger’s First Amendment right to 
anonymous online speech, and what a plaintiff must show to discover an 
                                                 
40 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 941. 
41 Peterson, supra note 33, at 8, 11. 
42 China, supra note 39, at 6. 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).  Generally, “[a] communication is 
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him.”  Id. § 559.  While the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides an initial analysis of 
defamation law, the boundaries of defamation “have been constrained by a speaker’s free 
speech rights under the First Amendment.”  Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a 
(Screen) Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPS to Reveal the Identities of 
Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamations Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2751 
(2002). 
44 O’Brien, supra note 43, at 2746. 
45 See Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425 Mar. 
Term 2004, 2006 WL 37020, at *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006) (“Faced with the problems and 
benefits of Internet, courts have arrived at differing standards for determining whether to 
allow disclosure of an anonymous internet user’s identity when the user is sued for making 
defamatory statements over the Internet.”). 
46 Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-
Wringing Over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 801 (2004).  Mr. Vogel warns that 
although “well intentioned, the rush to apply new standards should be slowed.”  Id. 
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anonymous blogger’s identity.47  In balancing the competing interests, 
the anonymous blogger has a First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously and the plaintiff has the right to protect proprietary 
interests and reputation through the pursuit of the available causes of 
action based on the conduct of the anonymous blogger.48  Leaving 
                                                 
47 Doe v. 2TheMart.Com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  In 
2TheMart.Com Inc., the court articulated a balancing test for determining when, through a 
civil subpoena, the identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party to the 
underlying litigation would be disclosed.  Id. at 1095.  The test is: 
whether: (1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good 
faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought 
relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is 
directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) 
information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense 
is unavailable from any other source. 
Id. 
48 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No.3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. 2001).  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court set forth its state’s standard for when granting an order compelling an 
Internet Service Provider to disclose the identity of an anonymous Internet poster who is 
sued for allegedly violating the rights of an individual, corporation or business.  Id.  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court outlined a balancing test in which 
the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to 
notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena 
or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford 
the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and 
serve opposition to the application.  These notification efforts should 
include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery 
request to the anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board. 
 The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set for the 
exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that 
plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech. 
 The complaint and all information provided to the court should 
be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a 
prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously–named anonymous 
defendants.  In addition to establishing that its action can withstand a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted . . . the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting 
each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a 
court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed 
defendant. 
 Finally, assuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has 
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the 
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against 
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the 
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff 
to properly proceed. 
Id. at 760-61.  See also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (adopting a standard to 
apply when a public figure plaintiff seeks to identify an anonymous defendant).  The 
Delaware Supreme Court adopted a standard “that appropriately balances one person’s 
right to speak anonymously against another person’s right to protect his reputation.”  Id.  
The Delaware Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a defamation suit against an 
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behind defamation, an alternative tort theory that is available is invasion 
of privacy.49  
Invasion of privacy is a cause of action in which bloggers could find 
themselves as either a plaintiff or defendant.50  Invasion of privacy 
consists of four different theories:  intrusion upon seclusion, publicizing 
private facts, false light, and appropriation of name or likeness.51  There 
is a trend in employment law to bring wrongful termination suits under 
a common law invasion of privacy theory as employees have become 
increasingly sensitive about keeping their employers out of their private 
lives.52  While common law invasion of privacy can signal a cause of 
action on its own, in the employment relationship, it can also be used in 
conjunction with a wrongful termination suit as an argument for an 
extension of a public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine.53  Blogging employees, especially those working under an 
employment-at-will presumption, are finding out that tortuous wrongful 
termination suits are often misplaced under the current employment law 
jurisprudence.54   
3. Blogging and the Employment Relationship    
Constitutional and tort law conflicts are just some of the many legal 
issues that blogs present in employment law, affecting both employers 
and employees alike.55  Nevertheless, the popularity of blogging 
continues to grow.56  Employees maintain blogs about many different 
                                                                                                             
anonymous blogger must meet a summary judgment standard before the courts would 
order disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity.  Id. at 457. 
49 See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the invasion of privacy claims 
that a blogger may have brought against him or that he may bring). 
50 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers’ FAQ—Privacy, http://www.eff.org/ 
bloggers/lg/faq-privacy.php (last visited Aug, 9, 2007) (answering questions about 
invasion of privacy liability). 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
52 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 480 (3rd ed. 2004). 
53 See infra Part II.B (discussing the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine). 
54 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing a general overview of blogging and the employment 
relationship). 
55 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (identifying the several legal issues 
applicable to blogging). 
56 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing the growth of blogging).  
Employers are increasingly becoming aware of the potential issues employees’ blogs raise 
because of bloggers’ ability to “post content that disparages the company, defames the 
company’s image, calls into question the company’s financial performance, harasses other 
employees, or leaks the company’s proprietary information.”  Rita & Gunning, supra note 
19, at 56. 
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subjects, some of which are specifically geared toward other employees 
in the same industry or profession.57  Some employers have corporate 
blogs with corresponding corporate blogging policies, which encourage 
employee blogging if done in compliance with the aforementioned 
corporate blogging policies.58  A number of employee blogs that describe 
                                                 
57 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1086.  Employee blogs that are geared specifically 
toward a particular industry often solicit feedback from fellow employees or are 
informational to keep co-workers up to date on “issues of collective concern.”  Id.  Other 
employee bloggers seek to discuss the various aspects of their jobs with others in the same 
industry.  Id.  “Bloggers of this type can be found in a variety of professions such as law, 
accounting, and medicine, as well as in other industries such as the construction industry.”  
Id. 
58 See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Sun News—Sun Blogs, http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/ 
media/blogs/policy.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2007) (outlining advice for employee blogs 
and encouraging employees to blog about their work, provided that the employee follows 
“the advise in this note”); Sun Microsystems, Sun’s Blogging Guidelines, http://www.sun. 
com/aboutsun/media/blogs/BloggingGuidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 9 2007) 
(summarizing the companies general guidelines for employee blogs).  Sun Microsystems’ 
advice centers on being careful and responsible; however, the company clearly states, 
“violation of any applicable company policy may result in disciplinary action up to and 
including termination of employment.”  Sun Microsystems, Sun’s Blogging Guidelines, 
supra. 
Posting the wrong thing on your blog could: 
• Lose Sun its right to export technology outside the U.S. 
• Get Sun and you in legal trouble with U.S. and other government 
agencies. 
• Lose Sun its trademark on key terms like Java and Solaris. 
• Cost us the ability to get patents. 
• Cost you your job at Sun. 
Id.  The most important rules for Sun employees to follow when blogging include: 
1. Do not disclose or speculate on non-public financial or operation 
information.  The legal consequences could be swift and severe for you 
and Sun. 
2. Do not disclose non-public technical information (for example, 
code) without approval.  Sun could instantly lose its right to export its 
products and technologies to most of the world or to protect its 
intellectual property. 
3. Do not disclose personal information about other individuals. 
4. Do not disclose confidential information, Sun’s or anyone else’s. 
5. Do not discuss work-related legal proceedings or controversies, 
including communications with Sun attorneys. 
6. Always refer to Sun’s trademarked names properly.  For example, 
never use a trademark as a noun, since this could result in a loss of our 
trademark rights. 
7. Do not post others’ material, for example photographs, articles, or 
music, without ensuring they’ve granted appropriate permission to do 
this. 
Follow Sun’s Standards of Business Conduct and uphold Sun’s 
reputation for integrity.  In particular, ensure that your comments 
about companies and products are truthful, accurate, and fair and can 
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be substantiated, and avoid disparaging comments about individuals.  
Id.  Yahoo advises its employees of the legal ramifications of their 
blogs, and has instituted best practices guidelines for employees to 
follow if they blog.  Yahoo! Personal Blog Guidelines: 1.0, 
http://jermey.zawodny.com/yahoo/yahoo-blog-guidelines.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2007).  Yahoo’s best practices guidelines are not rules, 
and therefore cannot be broken, but should voluntarily be followed.   
Id. at 2.  There are four best practices guidelines, including: 
Be Respectful of Your Colleagues 
1.  Be thoughtful and accurate in your posts, and be respectful of 
how other Yahoos may be affected. All Yahoo! employees can be 
viewed (correctly or incorrectly) as representative of the company, 
which can add significance to your public reflections on the 
organization (whether you intend to or not). Yahoos who identify 
themselves as Yahoo! employees in their blogs and comment on the 
company at any time, should notify their manager of the existence of 
their blog just to avoid any surprises. To be clear, you are not being 
asked to alert your manager of your posts, just to consider letting them 
know you have a blog where you may write about Yahoo!. Whether 
your manager chooses to occasionally read your blog or not, the 
courtesy head’s up is always appreciated. 
Get Your Facts Straight 
2.  As a Yahoo! employee with intranet access, you have the 
opportunity to contact the Yahoos who are responsible for the 
products, services, or other initiatives that you may want to write 
about. To ensure you are not misrepresenting your fellow Yahoos or 
their work, consider reaching out to a member of the relevant team 
before posting. This courtesy will help you provide your readers with 
accurate insights, especially when you are blogging outside your area 
of expertise. If there is someone at Yahoo! who knows more about the 
topic than you, check with them to make sure you have your facts 
straight. 
Provide Context to Your Argument 
3.  Please be sure to provide enough support in your posting to help 
Yahoos understand your reasoning, be it positive or negative. We 
appreciate the value of multiple perspectives, so help us to understand 
yours by providing context to your opinion. Whether you are posting 
in praise or criticism of Yahoo!, you are encouraged to develop a 
thoughtful argument that extends well beyond “(insert) is cool” or 
“(insert) sucks.” 
Engage in Private Feedback: 
4.  Not everyone who is reading your blog will feel comfortable 
approaching you if they are concerned their feedback will become 
public. In order to maintain an open dialogue that everyone can 
comfortably engage in, Yahoo! bloggers are asked to welcome “off-
blog” feedback from their colleagues who would like to privately 
respond, make suggestions, or report errors without having their 
comments appear your blog. Bloggers want to know what you think. If 
you have an opinion, correction or criticism regarding a posting, reach 
out for the blogger directly. Whether privately or on their blog, let the 
blogger know your thoughts. 
Byers: Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A Proposal for Blogging, Employ
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
258 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
aspects of an employee’s personal life and work life, have received 
extensive media attention after the blog caught the attention of the 
blogger’s employer, and ended in termination.59  Unfortunately, it is 
usually only after an employee is fired that the employee learns of the 
employment relationship’s legal considerations.60  Furthermore, while 
employers and employees alike have legal rights, remedies, and 
responsibilities within the employment relationship, the employment-at-
will doctrine usually trumps many of the employee’s rights.61   
B. Blogs and the Application of Judicial Employment Law:  Employment-at-
Will 
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where 
they please, and to discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for 
good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without 
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.  It is a right 
which an employe[e] may exercise in the same way, to the 
same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the 
employer.62 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 2-3.  See also Floyd III & Hedgepath, supra note 33, at 38 (discussing the popularity of 
corporate and workplace blogs in major corporations, including IBM); Peterson, supra note 
33, at 10 (discussing the rational behind corporate blogging including marketing new ideas 
and products); Ebanks et al., supra note 7. 
Commentators are already calling 2005 “The Year of the Corporate 
Blog,” as a number of the nation’s leading companies – including GM, 
Boeing, Microsoft and Sun Microsystems – have leapt into the fray, 
publishing official corporate blogs or quasi-official blogs authored  by 
corporate insiders.  These corporate blogs can permit global 
communication at minimal cost, raise a company’s profile, help roll out 
a new product or redefine a brand’s image. 
Ebanks et al., supra note 7. 
59 Hudson, supra note 31, at 133-34; see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (detailing 
the stories of dooced employees). 
60 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103; see also Peterson, supra note 33, at 8,10 
(warning that “bloggers should be – but almost universally are not—familiar with basic 
legal issues inescapable in a medium in which every thought can be read by an Internet 
audience of untold millions”); Armour, supra note 6, at B1 (reporting on several employees’ 
stories of termination because of the content of their blogs, many of which claimed to have 
had no warning).  See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers’ FAQ: Labor Law, 
http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-labor.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing legal 
issues arising from employees’ blogs). 
61 See infra Part II.B (examining blogging and the employment-at-will doctrine). 
62 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), rev’d on other grounds, Hutton v. 
Waters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
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Employment law in the United States is founded on the 
employment-at-will doctrine.63  The employment-at-will doctrine is a 
departure from the English common law regarding the agricultural 
master and servant relationships.64  Originally, the employment-at-will 
doctrine was a legal presumption that governed employer and employee 
relations, and provided that the employment relationship was 
terminable by either party without penalty.65  Today, the employment-at-
will doctrine is largely a legal rule, “not subject to rebuttal except in 
extraordinary circumstances.”66  Nearly every state follows the 
                                                 
63 ALFRED G. FELIU, PRIMER ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1996).  In the 
1880’s the employment-at-will doctrine began to permeate American law.  Id. 
[I]n 1877, Horace Gay Wood, a respected attorney from Albany, New 
York, published a treatise entitled [sic] Master and Servant, which 
authoritatively announced that in the United States ‘‘the rule is 
inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at 
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden 
is upon him to establish it by proof.’’  Although Wood’s analysis has 
subsequently been fully discredited, the rule he announced was 
uniformly followed by the U.S. courts. 
Id. at 3.  Over the years, the employment-at-will doctrine grew and developed into a body 
of law that governed employer and employee relations.  Id. at 1.  Since the 1970’s the 
employment-at-will doctrine has remained unfettered, consistent, and largely unchanged.  
Id.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958).  The American Law 
Institute defines employment-at-will or period of employment as the following: 
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to 
employ and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which 
are terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates 
the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening 
events. 
Id. 
64 ANDREW D. HILL, “WRONGFUL DICHARGE” AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL 
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 1 (1987); see also FELIU, supra note 63, at 1.  In England when a 
servant was hired, the presumption was for a one-year term.  Feliu, supra note 63, at 2.  The 
one year term presumption worked well in an agricultural society because “masters were 
assured of labor during the planting and harvesting seasons, while servants were secure in 
the knowledge that they would be cared for during the harsh winter months.”  Id.  The 
need for the employment-at-will doctrine grew out of the industrialization in America and 
“provided American industry with a steady and flexible workforce that helped propel the 
economic growth of a rapidly industrializing nation.”  Id. at 3. 
65 FELIU, supra note 63, at 1.  As a legal presumption, the employment-at-will doctrine 
could be rebutted by the particular facts and circumstances of the case.  Id.  See also Pauline 
T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 
677 (1996) (“Just as the employee is free to quite her job for any reason at all, the employer 
may discharge an employee ‘for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, 
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.’”). 
66 FELIU, supra note 63, at 1.  The shift from a legal presumption to a legal rule changed 
the dynamics of challenging wrongful discharge claims.  Id.; see also Kim, supra note 65, at 
677.  Ms. Kim points out that although the employment-at-will doctrine is a presumption of 
which the parties are always free to contract to the contrary, today, the presumption has 
the weight of a legal rule.  Id. at 677. 
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employment-at-will doctrine.67  Courts have created exceptions in 
specific circumstances to deviate from the general rules of the 
employment-at-will doctrine.68  These exceptions generally fall into two 
categories, those based in contract and those based in public policy, each 
of which are discussed in turn in this Section.69  
1. Exceptions Based in Contract  
The good faith and fair dealing exception is the least recognized 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because of a grounded 
adherence to the right of freedom of contract.70  The good faith and fair 
dealing exception is an outgrowth of implied contract law.71  
Jurisdictions that recognize the good faith and fair dealing exception 
have generally done so by interpreting employee handbooks as an 
implied contractual obligation.72  Employers may overcome the 
                                                 
67 Montana and the District of Columbia do not adhere to the employment-at-will 
doctrine.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2005) (“A discharge is wrongful only if . . . the 
discharge was not for good cause . . .”). 
68 Kim, supra note 65, at 678 (noting that the exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine may seem numerous, but “they are generally narrow in scope and quite 
specifically defined”). 
69 See infra Parts II.B.1-2 (explaining both contractual and public policy exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine). 
70 Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-
Will Doctrine: Its’s Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1994). 
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).  “Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”  
Id. 
a. Express and implied contracts.  Contracts are often spoken of as 
express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no difference in 
legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just as 
assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes 
including silence, so intention to make a promise may be manifested in 
language or by implication from other circumstances, including course 
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. 
 . . . 
b. Quasi-contracts.  Implied contracts are different from quasi-contracts, 
although in some cases the line between the two is indistinct. . . .  
Quasi-contracts have often been called implied contracts or contracts 
implied in law; but, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based 
on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances 
in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law 
for reasons of justice. 
Id. at § 4. 
72 See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 749-50.  The “handbook exception” to the 
employment-at-will rule was generally not recognized before the 1980’s.  Id.  A majority of 
state courts have decided that under the right circumstances employee handbooks can 
create an implied contract.  Id. at 750. 
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argument that an employee handbook creates an implied contract by 
using a disclaimer in the handbook that specifically negates any 
possibility that the handbook creates promises.73  Employee handbooks, 
however, are not the only means by which courts identify implied 
contractual obligations.74   
Courts have also found oral assurances to be the basis of an implied 
contract for which the good faith and fair dealing exception applies.75  
The use of an implied contractual exception is extremely limited, and 
courts generally only allow its use in cases where an employee is 
unjustly discharged after many years of service, or if the discharge is an 
attempt to avoid paying an employee’s wages or other benefits.76  The 
limited applicability of this exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
lessens the likelihood that bloggers could successfully bring a wrongful 
discharge claim using it.77  Supplementary to the implied contract 
safeguards, the flexibility of the public policy exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine afford protection in many areas that 
contract based exceptions do not.78   
                                                 
73 Kim, supra note 64, at 680; see, e.g., Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health 
Planning Corp., 566 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Federal Express Corp. v. 
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993). 
Generally, courts require a disclaimer to be clear and unequivocal, 
conspicuously placed, and communicated to or acknowledged by the 
employee.  Employers that require employees to sign an 
acknowledgement of the disclaimer usually have success defending 
against claims based on their handbooks, assuming the disclaimer 
language is clear and they do not make representations inconsistence 
with at-will status.  Some of the most effective disclaimers have been 
contained in the employment application form, which applicants must 
sign, and not in an employee handbook.  Similarly, courts generally 
accept disclaimers printed in large type of placed at the beginning of 
the handbook. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 753. 
74 See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing oral assurances as a basis of 
implied employment contract formation). 
75 Kim, supra note 65, at 678. 
76 Pennington, supra note 70, at 1593. 
77 Gutman, supra note 17, at 160.  “One major caveat is inherent to this particular 
exception: any blogger claiming a violation of an implied contract must be certain to have 
clean hands.”  Id.  Mr. Gutman, in analyzing this exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, predicts that “[i]t is fairly clear that as a blogger, an employee cannot successfully 
claim this exception.”  Id. 
78 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the various judicially created public policy exceptions 
to the employment-at-will doctrine). 
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2. Public Policy Exceptions  
A variety of public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine exist.79  Generally, courts have granted public policy exceptions 
to the employment-at-will doctrine for employees discharged for 
refusing to participate in fraudulent practices such as, fraudulent 
submission of false documentation or claims, or participation in other 
unlawful criminal acts.80  One of the first decisions establishing the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine dealt with 
the wrongful termination of an employee who was fired for refusing to 
give false testimony at a legislative hearing.81   
Contrary to an employee engaging in criminal conduct, courts 
initially grappled to come to a consensus for a public policy exception 
when an employee was discharged for performing a statutory or 
constitutional duty.82  Initially, some courts refrained from legislating 
from the bench in creating such an exception, absent statutory authority 
or legislative history that would support such an exception.83  Employees 
                                                 
79 Pennington, supra note 70, at 1596.  Employees have also sued for wrongful discharge 
for refusing to engage in fraudulent bookkeeping or recordkeeping.  Id. 
80 See Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for Employees Who 
Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 375 (2007) (noting that only five states have not 
permitted a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for employees who 
refuse to violate the law on behalf of their employers). 
81 Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).  In 
Petermann, the plaintiff was fired after he refused to commit perjury on behalf of his 
employer.  Id.  The court held: 
to hold that one’s continued employment could be made contingent 
upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer 
would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both 
employee and employer and would serve to contaminate the honest 
administration of public affairs.  This is patently contrary to the public 
welfare. 
Id. at 27. 
82 Pennington, surpa note 70, at 1602.  Mr. Pennington points out that when courts were 
first faced with the issue of an employee being discharged for serving on a jury there were 
no statutes explicitly prohibiting such dismissals.  Id. 
The response taken by different courts, faced with the same issue, 
illustrates how judicial exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
have created unequal rights for employees and confusion in the law.  
While some courts are willing to find employer liability when state 
statutes are silent regarding activity allegedly causing dismissal, other 
courts decline to utilize the public policy exception and dismiss 
wrongful discharge actions not identifying a clear legislative 
pronouncement of the public interest. 
Id. 
83 Id. at 1603.  In Mallard v. Boring, the California Court of Appeals refused to 
acknowledge a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for an employee 
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who are fired for performing the civic service of jury duty best illustrate 
a situation in which the public policy exception for performing a 
statutory duty is applied.84  Courts now universally recognize a public 
policy exception for employees who have been terminated or sanctioned 
for taking time off work for jury duty, whether through a judicially 
created right or legislation that mandates such a result.85   
Turning to the issue of employer misconduct, as opposed to 
employee conduct, employees who report or expose their employer’s 
illegal conduct are known as whistleblowers.86  Courts and legislatures 
alike recognize a public interest in exposing illegal or unethical business 
practices.87  A public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
for whistleblowing attempts to strike a balance between the public’s 
interest in having employers follow the statutory law and the employer’s 
                                                                                                             
that had been discharged for taking time off work to serve on a jury.  6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960). 
Although we may feel that this would be good public policy, to so 
hold would establish a rule which would apply in all instances where 
persons are discharged from their employment because they have 
made themselves available for jury service, regardless of the 
circumstances.  If public policy requires that this protection should be 
afforded prospective jurors, we feel it should be done by the 
Legislature as they have done in the case of election officials. 
Id. at 175. 
84 Pennington, supra note 70, at 1602.  Other recognized statutory or constitutional duties 
include obeying a subpoena, testifying in a legal proceeding, and reporting abuse of 
children, the elderly, patients, and institutionalized individuals.  Rothstein, supra note 52, at 
784. 
85 See, e.g., Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Makovi v. 
Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000) (providing 
federal protection of jurors’ employment serving on federal juries).  “No employer shall 
discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason 
of such employee’s jury service, or the attendance or scheduled attendance in connection 
with such service, in any court of the United States.”  § 1875(a). 
86 Venessa F. Kunmann-Marco, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Employment At-Will 
Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 339 (1992); see also Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 
S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (explaining justification for whistleblower exception).  The term 
whistleblower: 
derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle upon 
becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other law 
enforcement officers and the public within the zone of danger. . . . Like 
this corner law enforcement official, the whistleblower sounds the 
alarm when wrongdoing occurs on his or her “beat,” which is usually 
within a large organization. 
Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 727 (citations omitted). 
87 See Gutman, supra note 17, at 161. 
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interest in control.88  Thus, many states and the federal government have 
enacted legislation to protect whistleblowers who report their 
employers.89   
Several state and federal statutes, in addition to the whistleblower 
protections, specifically prohibit firing an employee for exercising 
existing state or federally granted constitutional or statutory rights.90  
This public policy exception applies most often in cases where an 
employee was fired for filing a workers compensation claim, which is a 
state created statutory right.91  Employees looking to federal or state 
constitutionally created rights are generally unsuccessful in asserting 
claims, unless government action is involved.92   
Notwithstanding the fact that one of the most fundamental 
constitutionally created rights is the First Amendment’s freedom of 
speech protection, few courts have found a public policy exception in 
cases against private employers based on this constitutional provision, 
choosing instead to adhere to the general principle that the First 
Amendment protections are only applicable to government actions.93  
                                                 
88 Julie Jones, Comment, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretation of the 
Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1133, 1148 
(2003); see also Kunmann-Marco, supra note 86, at 347. 
89 Jones, supra note 88, at 1148 (2003).  Almost all states and the federal government 
recognize the whistleblower exception, but the extent to which it is applied varies greatly.  
Id.  One state, Virginia, does not recognize a whistleblower exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine.  Id.  See also Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State 
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000) (discussing the various federal 
statutory provisions protecting whistleblowers as well as the vast differences among state 
statutory protections for whistleblowing). 
90 Kim, supra note 65, at 678.  Other federal laws prohibit employers from dismissing 
employees for asserting certain statutory rights.  See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (stating that discrimination against or discharge of employee for 
exercising rights under the NLRA is an “unfair labor practice”); Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to discharge an employee for filing a 
complaint under the FLSA); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2000) 
(forbidding the discharge of employee for filing complaint pursuant to OSHA); Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (forbidding the discharge of an 
employee for exercising ERISA rights); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) 
(2000) (prohibiting discharge of any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful 
by FMLA). 
91 Pennington, supra note 70, at 1599. 
92 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 775. 
93 Id. at 775-76; see, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).  In 
Novosel the plaintiff was fired for refusing to participate in the lobbying effort of his 
employer.  721 F.2d at 896.  The plaintiff had privately stated his opposition to his 
employer’s political stand.  Id.  The suit was brought as a wrongful discharge claim and the 
plaintiff argued that his firing violated public policy.  Id.  The court, sitting in diversity 
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Many courts refuse to create a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine for private sector employees who are fired 
for exercising their free speech rights.94  For bloggers in the private 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction, interpreted Pennsylvania law and found that Pennsylvania recognized a 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Id. at 897-99.  The court 
interpreted Pennsylvania case law to allow for the exception under the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, or the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Id. at 899.  Thus, the 
court held that there was “an important public policy is at stake . . . that Novosel’s 
allegations state a claim . . . that Novosel’s complaint discloses no plausible and legitimate 
reason for terminating his employment, and his discharge violates a clear mandate of 
public policy.”  Id. at 900.  Since Novosel, Pennsylvania courts have not followed Novosel 
and have not permitted a wrongful discharge cause of action under a constitutional 
provision absent a showing of state action.  See, e.g., Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 843-44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986).  In 1992, therefore, the Third Circuit found: 
In light of the narrowness of the public policy exception and of the 
Pennsylvania courts’ continuing insistence upon the state action 
requirement, we predict that if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would not look to the First and Fourth Amendments as 
sources of public policy when there is no state action. 
Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir.1992).  While the First 
Amendment does protect the fundamental right of free speech, it only does so when a state 
actor is infringing upon those rights.   CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 1069.  Moreover, in 
the employment context, public sector employees’ free speech rights are protected only 
when they are speaking out on a matter of public concern.  Id. at 1070.  There is a three step 
analysis for public employee’s free speech claims: 
(1) The employee must prove that an adverse employment action was 
motivated by the employee’s speech; if the employee does this, the 
burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the same action would have been taken anyway; (2) the 
speech must be deemed to be a matter of public concern; (3) the court 
must balance the employee’s speech rights against the employer’s 
interest in the efficient functioning of the office. 
Id. at 1071.  The First Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteen 
Amendment.  See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  The Fourteenth 
Amendment states, in pertinent part, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
94 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1096; see, e.g., Wiegand v. Motiva Enter. LLC., 295 F. 
Supp. 2d 465, 474-75 (D.N.J. 2003).  In Wiegand, the plaintiff was fired after his employer 
found out that he was selling racist, neo-nazi paraphernalia on his website. 295 F. Supp. 2d 
at 470, 472.  The plaintiff urged the court to adopt the third circuits ruling in Novosel v. 
Nationwide Ins.Co.,721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d. Cir. 1983), where the court held that state statutory 
free speech rights could be used as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine.  Id.  Without reaching a direct decision whether or not to apply Novosel, the court 
held that: 
[t]he First Amendment does not provide absolute protection for all 
speech . . .  and three of its limitations are relevant in this case, namely 
the limitations based on commercial speech, on fighting words, and on 
speech in the employment context.  The issue here is not whether 
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sector, application of this exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
requires demonstration that public policy is in favor of a blogger’s free 
speech.95  Courts consistently decline to extend such a public policy to 
free speech or interfere with a private employer’s discretion in this 
area.96  As a result of judicial hesitancy to extend a public policy 
exception to free speech, employees typically look to statutory mandates 
to have their wrongful termination claims prevail.97  Several states have 
enacted employment protections by means of lifestyle discrimination 
statutes.98   
C. Blogs and the Application of Legislative Employment Law:  Lifestyle 
Discrimination Statutes  
Lifestyle discrimination statutes protect an employee’s use of lawful 
products or participation in lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or 
speech.99  Specifically, lifestyle discrimination statutes usually protect 
some form of lawful off-duty activity from intrusion by private sector 
employers.100  For instance, statutes in thirty states and the District of 
Columbia protect smokers, or others who use other lawful consumable 
products from termination based solely on such activities.101  Although 
                                                                                                             
plaintiff’s speech could form the basis of a First Amendment claim, but 
is instead whether defendants’ restrictions on plaintiff’s speech 
violated a “clear mandate of public policy.”  This Court finds that it 
did not because the speech was not “clearly protected” by the First 
Amendment due to its nature as commercial hate speech regulated by 
an employer. 
Id. at 474-75. 
95 Gutman, supra note 17, at 164. 
96 Id. 
Thus, the ‘‘strongest’’ of public policies may prove to hold no power 
over private employers, unless the blogger can sufficiently 
demonstrate that the blog is supported by that public policy, which is 
problematic.  Though there is a public policy in favor of free speech, it 
is not an unfettered policy, and as such, it may not be enough to shield 
the blogger’s job. 
Id. 
97 See infra Part II.C (discussing lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
98 See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing the kinds of lifestyle 
discrimination statutes). 
99 FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 425 (Karen E. Ford et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); see 
infra note 101 and accompanying text (listing the currently enacted lifestyle discrimination 
statutes). 
100 Ann L. Rives, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Discrimination 
Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2006). 
101 NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER CONTROL OF LEGAL 
OFF DUTY EMPLOYEE ACTIVITIES 12-13, http://workrights.org/issue_lifestyle/dbrief2.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2007); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.02 (2006); CAL. LAB. CODE 
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protections among the various statutory provisions vary widely from 
state to state, there are two basic types of state statutes protecting 
employees’ off-duty conduct.102  The first type of legislation protects 
lawful use of consumable products.103  Quite distinctly, the second 
                                                                                                             
§ 96(k) (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40s 
(2003); D.C. CODE § 6-913.3 (2006); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5; IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(1) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 
(2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-A (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2007); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 290.145 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333 
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 2000); N.M. 
STAT. § 50-11-3 (2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW. § 201-d (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 500 (West 1999); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.315 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 23-20.10-14 (2006); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 41-1-85 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-60 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1427 (2006); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 15.2-1504; W.V. CODE § 21-3-19 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.35 (West 2002); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (2006). 
102 Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use 
of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
625, 640 (2004); Rives, supra note 100, at 556. 
103 Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640.  Consumable product protection legislation came 
into existence in the late 1980’s as a way of prohibiting employers from discriminating or 
terminating employees for using lawful products during off duty hours.  FUNDAMENTALS 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 99, at 425.  Early on, the tobacco industry began lobbying 
for laws to protect smokers from discrimination at work.  Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 641.  
Ms. Pagnattaro notes that the initial consumable products legislation gained support from 
many diverse groups.  Id.  In fact, strong support came from “the American Civil Liberties 
Union, organized labor, the National Association for the Advancement of Fat Acceptance, 
the American Motorcycle Association, and the tobacco industry.”  Id.  The initial concern 
was that employers would discriminate against smokers in favor of nonsmokers based on 
their habits away from work, instead of their job qualifications or credentials.  
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 99, at 425. 
The Legislature finds and declares that regulation of smoking in the 
workplace is a matter of statewide interest and concern. It is the intent 
of the Legislature in enacting this section to prohibit the smoking of 
tobacco products in all (100 percent of) enclosed places of employment 
in this state, as covered by this section, thereby eliminating the need of 
local governments to enact workplace smoking restrictions within their 
respective jurisdictions.  It is further the intent of the Legislature to 
create a uniform statewide standard to restrict and prohibit the 
smoking of tobacco products in enclosed places of employment, as 
specified in this section, in order to reduce employee exposure to 
environmental tobacco smoke to a level that will prevent anything 
other than insignificantly harmful effects to exposed employees, and 
also to eliminate the confusion and hardship that can result from 
enactment or enforcement of disparate local workplace smoking 
restrictions. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5.  North Carolina, the home state of tobacco company R.J. 
Reynolds, initially passed one of the most comprehensive consumable products laws.  
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category protects other lawful off-duty conduct, activities, or speech.104  
While none of the most comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes 
specifically protect both at-will employees’ blogging activities and their 
speech exercised within their blog, even when done off-duty, on 
personal computers, and without materially effecting their employer’s 
interests, lifestyle discrimination statutes are the most likely source of 
protection.105  This Section examines the lifestyle discrimination statutes 
that protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech.106 
1. Lawful Off-Duty Activity Protection  
Broad lifestyle discrimination statutes that forbid discrimination 
based on lawful off-duty conduct are few and far between.107  Five states, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and North Dakota, 
provide the most comprehensive protection for an employee’s lawful off-
duty activities, conduct, or speech.108  An overview of the existing 
                                                                                                             
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 642.  North Carolina’s statute, protecting public and private 
employee’s right to use lawful consumable products states: 
(a) As used in this section, “employer” means the State and all political 
subdivisions of the State, public and quasi-public corporations, boards, 
bureaus, commissions, councils, and private employers with three or 
more regularly employed employees. 
(b) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or 
refuse to hire a prospective employee, or discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the prospective 
employee or the employee engages in or has engaged in the lawful use 
of lawful products if the activity occurs off the premises of the 
employer during nonworking hours and does not adversely affect the 
employee’s job performance or the person’s ability to properly fulfill 
the responsibilities of the position in question or the safety of other 
employees. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2005). 
104 See infra Part II.C.1. 
105 See infra Part II.C.1 (giving an overview of the most comprehensive lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech). 
106 See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text (discussing individual state’s 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect off-duty conduct, activities, or 
speech). 
107 Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 377, 416 (2003). 
108 See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (explaining the comprehensive lifestyle 
discrimination statutes); see also Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640.  Ms. Pagnattaro notes 
that this second category of lawful off-duty conduct statutes has a wide range of 
protections.  Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640.  The protections “range from California’s 
very broad wording, to a narrower focus in Connecticut where private employees’ First 
Amendment rights are protected against violations by their employers.”  Id.  “California, 
New York, North Dakota and Colorado all have statutes that protect a broader range of 
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comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect an 
employee’s lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech reveals the 
expansive breadth some state legislatures have taken to protect an 
employee’s life away from work.109   
i. California  
California’s statute, one of the most expansive in the nation, protects 
employee rights regarding off-duty conduct.110  California’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute protects lawful off-duty conduct by giving both 
employees and job applicants the right to bring a claim through the 
state’s Labor Commissioner against employers.111  Based on a plain 
language reading of the law, it protects all lawful off-duty conduct 
without any exception and provides an expansive and comprehensive 
shield for an employee’s off-duty rights.112  This expansive, plain 
                                                                                                             
activity. . . . Connecticut protects employees who exercise certain federal and state 
constitutional rights from adverse action by their employers.”  Id. at 646. 
109 See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (explaining state lifestyle discrimination 
statutes that protect employees’ lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech). 
110 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003). 
The Labor Commissioner and his or her deputies and representatives 
authorized by him or her in writing shall, upon the filing of a claim 
therefore by an employee, or an employee representative authorized in 
writing by an employee, with the Labor Commissioner, take 
assignments of: 
(k) Claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or 
discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during 
nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises. 
§ 96(k). 
111 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); see also 1999 CAL. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 692 
(Deering).  Section one states the findings of the California legislature in enacting the law: 
The Legislature finds and declares that, absent the protections afforded 
to employees by the Labor Commissioner, an individual employee is 
ill-equipped and unduly disadvantaged in any effort to assert the civil 
rights otherwise guaranteed by Article I of the California Constitution.  
The Legislature further finds and declares that allowing any employer 
to deprive an employee of any constitutionally guaranteed civil 
liberties, regardless of the rationale offered, is not in the public interest.  
The Legislature further declares that this act is necessary to further the 
state interest in protecting the civil rights of individual employees who 
would not otherwise be able to protect themselves. 
1999 CAL. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 692 (Deering). 
112 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 647.  Unlike 
other state’s laws, California contains no exceptions to allow discrimination or termination 
if the lawful activity conflicts with the employer’s business interest or creates a conflict of 
interest.  Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 647.  “Not surprisingly, immediately after its 
enactment, concerns arose about the scope of the statute and the ramifications for 
employers in California.”  Id.  But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001); N.Y. LAB. 
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language reading of the statute was short lived, however, as an early 
interpretation by California’s Attorney General limited the scope to 
reach only independently recognized constitutional or statutory rights.113   
ii.   Colorado 
Unlike California’s expansive statute, Colorado’s statutory 
protection for an employee’s off-duty conduct only prohibits restrictions 
on non-work and off-duty activities.114  Colorado’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute creates a right for employees to engage in lawful 
off-duty activities.115  The right is not absolute, as the statute creates 
exceptions that allow an employer to fire an employee for engaging in 
lawful activities that are related to an occupational requirement or create 
a conflict of interest.116  For instance, Colorado’s statute has been 
interpreted to protect, and thus not to create a conflict of interest, when 
an employee writes a critical letter to the newspaper about his or her 
employer.117  However, Colorado’s statute, while protecting off-duty 
                                                                                                             
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005) (providing 
exceptions to the lawful off-duty conduct statutes). 
113 83 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 226 (2000).  “[S]ection 96 did not create new substantive rights 
for employees. Rather, it established a procedural mechanism that allows the 
Commissioner to assert, on behalf of employees, their independently recognized 
constitutional rights.”  Id. 
114 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001). 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an 
employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that 
employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the 
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction: 
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably 
and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities 
of a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather 
than to all employees of the employer; or 
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities 
to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest. 
§ 24-34-402.5(1). 
115 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001). 
116 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001); supra notes 112, 114 (noting the 
exceptions to the Colorado statute). 
117 See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997). 
In interpreting the plain meaning of the statute, the term conflict of 
interest should be given its generally understood meaning; that is, that 
it relates to “fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of private 
interest or gain to them” or a “situation in which regard for one duty 
tends to lead to disregard of another.” 
Id.  The court went on to find that despite the fact that the critical letter to the newspaper 
created no conflict of interest under the statute, the employer was still justified in firing the 
employee because the court found the letter breached an implied duty of loyalty because it 
had nothing to do with a matter of public safety.  Id. 
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activities, still creates the possibility, using analogous case law, that an 
employer can get around the statute by claiming the employee did not 
address a matter of public concern.118   
iii.   Connecticut  
Diverging from California and Colorado’s protections for lawful off-
duty activities, Connecticut provides broad protection for an employee 
exercising federal or state constitutional rights.119  Connecticut enacted 
its Free Speech Act to remedy the disparity between public sector 
employees who enjoy First Amendment free speech protection when 
commenting on matters of public concern and private sector at-will 
employees who have no First Amendment protection in their 
employment.120  The statute extends the same protection for free speech 
that the First Amendment gives public employees, with the exception 
                                                 
118 See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997). 
119 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2003). 
Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political 
subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or 
discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights 
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution 
or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, 
provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere 
with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working 
relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to 
such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, 
including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part 
of the costs of any such action for damages.  If the court determines 
that such action for damages was brought without substantial 
justification, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees 
to the employer. 
§ 31-51q. 
120 Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private 
Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1581 (1998); see also 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 463 (discussing freedom of expression in employment 
law). 
Public employee freedom of expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the 
Supreme Court established a three-party test to determine whether the 
discharge of a public employee was made on the basis of protected 
speech.  First, the employee must be speaking on a matter of public 
concern.  Second, the court must balance the interests of the employee, 
as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the 
government employer’s interest in running an efficient operation.  
Third, the employee’s protected conduct must be a motivating factor in 
the government employer’s decision to discharge.  The third element, 
causation, is a question for the trier of fact only if the court has 
resolved the first two elements in favor of the employee. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 463-64. 
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that the speech is not protected if it substantially or materially interferes 
with the employee’s job.121 
iv.   New York 
Contrasting Connecticut’s Free Speech Act, New York’s labor code 
provides employees with protection for off-duty activities in specific 
circumstances.122  New York protects four categories of off-duty conduct 
for which an employer is not able to discriminate against job applicants 
or terminate employees because of participation in the protected 
categories of off-duty conduct.123  Under the New York statute, 
employers maintain the right to discriminate against job applicants or 
terminate employees at-will when the protected conduct would cause a 
material conflict of interest related to trade secrets, proprietary 
                                                 
121 Eule & Varat, supra note 120, at 1581. 
122 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002). 
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any 
employer or employment agency to refuse to hire, employ or license, 
or to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual in compensation, promotion or terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment because of: 
a. an individual’s political activities outside of working hours, off of 
the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment 
or other property, if such activities are legal, provided, however, that 
this paragraph shall not apply to persons whose employment is 
defined in paragraph six of subdivision (a) of section seventy-nine-h of 
the civil rights law, and provided further that this paragraph shall not 
apply to persons who would otherwise be prohibited from engaging in 
political activity pursuant to chapter 15 of title 5 and subchapter III of 
chapter 73 of title 5 of the USCA; 
b. an individual’s legal use of consumable products prior to the 
beginning or after the conclusion of the employee’s work hours, and 
off of the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s 
equipment or other property; 
c. an individual’s legal recreational activities outside work hours, off of 
the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment 
or other property; or 
d. an individual’s membership in a union or any exercise of rights 
granted under Title 29, USCA, Chapter 7 or under article fourteen of 
the civil service law. 
Id. 
123 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002) (listing protected conduct as political 
activities, use of legal consumable products, legal recreational activities, and union 
membership).  Recreational activities are defines as “any lawful, leisure-time activity, for 
which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged in for 
recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading 
and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.”  Id. at § 201-d(1)(b). 
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information, or business interests.124  Furthermore, only recreational 
activities are protected, rather than any lawful activity or conduct.  Thus, 
the New York statute is narrower than those of other states by protecting 
only conduct categorized as recreational.125   
v.   North Dakota  
As opposed to only protecting recreational activities, North Dakota’s 
statutory protection of lawful off-duty activities is part of the state’s anti-
discrimination and human rights statutory provisions.126  North Dakota’s 
                                                 
124 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(3)(a) (McKinney 2002) (stating “the provisions of 
subdivision two of this section shall not be deemed to protect activity which: creates a 
material conflict of interest related to the employer’s trade secrets, proprietary information 
or other proprietary or business interest”). 
125 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1100; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003) 
(protecting lawful conduct); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001) (protecting lawful 
activities); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005) (protecting lawful participation in lawful 
activities). 
126 Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 659; see N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005). 
It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, the presence of any 
mental or physical disability, status with regard to marriage or public 
assistance, or participation in lawful activity off the employer’s 
premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with 
the essential business-related interests of the employer; to prevent and 
eliminate discrimination in employment relations, public 
accommodations, housing, state and local government services, and 
credit transactions; and to deter those who aid, abet, or induce 
discrimination or coerce others to discriminate. 
§14-02.4-01; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005). 
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a 
person; to discharge an employee; or to accord adverse or unequal 
treatment to a person or employee with respect to application, hiring, 
training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading, compensation, 
layoff, or a term, privilege, or condition of employment, because of 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental 
disability, status with respect to marriage or public assistance, or 
participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during 
nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential 
business-related interests of the employer.  It is a discriminatory 
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to make reasonable 
accommodations for an otherwise qualified person with a physical or 
mental disability or because of that person’s religion.  This chapter 
does not prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has 
attained sixty-five years of age, but not seventy years of age, and who, 
for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in 
a bona fide executive or high policymaking position, if the employee is 
entitled to an immediate nonforfeiture annual retirement benefit from 
a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan, or 
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broad lifestyle discrimination statute applies to both employees and job 
applicants, prohibiting employers from engaging in discriminatory 
practices because of a job applicant or employee’s participation in lawful 
off-duty activities.127  The statute contains an exception for which 
protection is not extended if the activity is in direct conflict with an 
employer’s essential business related interest.128  The requirement that 
the activity be in direct conflict with an essential business interest affords 
employees engaged in blogging activities broader protection than states 
that provide an exception when there is a mere appearance of a conflict 
of interest or a material conflict of interest.129  In application, North 
Dakota courts do not give the statute an expansive definitional 
reading.130 
In sum, California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and North 
Dakota maintain legislation needed to provide employees with a better 
balance of bargaining power and to protect their off-duty conduct and 
privacy, yet more protection is needed in the case of at-will employee 
bloggers.131  Turning back to the issue of protecting lawful off-duty 
conduct, comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes are necessary to 
protect bloggers’ online activities and free speech rights.132  Such 
protection is necessary because courts have been particularly unwilling 
to carve out a free speech public policy exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine.133  Furthermore, the current lifestyle discrimination 
statutes do not lend reliable protection to bloggers.134  Bloggers must 
now turn to their state legislatures to pass or expand statutory protection 
                                                                                                             
any combination of those plans, of the employer of the employee, 
which equal, in the aggregate, at least forty-four thousand dollars. 
§ 14-02.4-03. 
127 See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005). 
128 See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005). 
129 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1101; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) 
(2001). 
130 Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 662. 
131 Rives, supra note 100, at 568.  Ms. Rives notes that employees are often left with no 
other choice but to allow their employee to control their off duty conduct or seek 
employment elsewhere.  Id.  The problem is that the job market has become more 
specialized, leaving many employees without job alternatives.  Id. 
132 See infra Part III.A (discussing why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be 
protected). 
133 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (explaining judicial reluctance to 
acknowledge a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for free speech 
rights). 
134 See infra Part III.C (examining some states’ lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
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for lawful off-duty activities or conduct and the speech that is associated 
with it.135   
III.  ANALYSIS 
Without statutory authority, courts are reluctant to carve out public 
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.136  Lifestyle 
discrimination statutes, which protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct, 
or speech are inadequate to protect at-will employee bloggers because 
the statutes lack protection for both the act of blogging and the speech 
that necessarily accompanies blogging.137  This loophole in lifestyle 
discrimination statutes must be closed in order to proactively address 
the issues that blogging technology presents.138  Furthermore, the public 
policies behind lifestyle discrimination statutes favor protecting both 
lawful off-duty employee activities or conduct and the speech associated 
with it.  Thus, state legislatures should consider the benefits of protecting 
at-will employee bloggers’ lawful off-duty activities and the online 
speech associated with their blogging activities.139  
First, this Part explains why at-will employee bloggers’ online 
speech should be protected.140  Second, this Part discusses why lifestyle 
discrimination statutes are the solution for protecting at-will employee 
bloggers’ lawful off-duty blogging activities.141  Finally, this Part 
identifies the loopholes in the currently enacted lifestyle discrimination 
statutes.142   
                                                 
135 See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be 
protected and the need for legislation to protect the speech). 
136 See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text (discussing the employment-at-will 
doctrine and the narrow public policy exceptions courts currently recognize). 
137 See infra Part III.C (discussing weakness in individual state lifestyle discrimination 
statutes). 
138 Wendy N. Davis, FEAR OF BLOGGING: As the Law Catches up to Technology, Bloggers 
Look for a Few Good Attorneys, 91 A.B.A. J. 16 (2005). 
139 David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee 
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 49 (1998). 
140 See infra Part III.A (explaining the policy of lifestyle discrimination statutes is not 
furthered if the statutes are not applicable to employee bloggers); see also Terry Ann 
Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 42, 70 (1987) (discussing why employees free speech should be protected). 
141 See infra Part III.B (explaining why legislation is needed in light of the courts 
unwillingness to recognize a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine 
that would include free speech). 
142 See infra Part III.C (explaining the loopholes that employee bloggers face under the 
current comprehensive lifestyles discrimination statutes). 
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A. Why Protect Bloggers’ Online Speech? 
The employment-at-will doctrine, in theory, gives both the employer 
and employee the right to terminate the relationship without 
justification, at any time.143  In reality, the employer controls the 
employment relationship because the employer, many times, can more 
easily afford the loss.144  Consequently, employees’ speech is chilled 
when there is no protection for their off-duty expression.145  As applied 
to blogs, the ambiguities in most lifestyle discrimination statutes do not 
guarantee that the activity of blogging will be protected, much less the 
speech that necessarily accompanies the blogging activities.146  First 
Amendment protections for employee bloggers are unclear because the 
protections seem dependant on varying standards associated with 
different tort actions or the employment-at-will doctrine.147  With few 
employers enacting official blogging policies, many employees have no 
clear guidance to conform their conduct within the law, as the “law” is 
murky and unsettled.148  To compensate for this legal ambiguity, 
consideration of public policy protections for at-will employee bloggers 
is necessary.149   
 Protection should be afforded to at-will employee bloggers in order 
to promote the policies lifestyle discrimination statutes were originally 
intended to advance.150  Furthermore, the policies that support 
                                                 
143 Halbert, supra note 140, at 70. 
144 Id.  Under the employment at-will doctrine, the employment relationship technically 
can be ended at will by either the employer or the employee; however, because an 
employee relies on the monetary and non-monetary benefits of having a job, the employer 
is able to exercise great power over the relationship.  Id.  Job loss is hard on employees 
particularly, because of the loss of wages but also because “loss of both seniority and 
pension benefits as well as the intangible hardships associated with obtaining another job.”  
Id. 
145 Yamada, supra note 139, at 50.  Mr. Yamada notes that employee’s experience whose 
free speech is not protected “creates the kind of uncertainty and ambiguity that in some 
ways may inhibit free speech.”  Id. 
146 See supra Part II.1 (describing the protections of the currently enacted lifestyle 
discrimination statutes); Part III.C (describing the shortcomings of the currently enacted 
lifestyle discrimination statutes as applied to bloggers). 
147 See supra Parts II.A.2-3 (discussing First Amendment and state tort protections for 
wrongful discharge actions). 
148 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty bloggers face 
in employment law); see also note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Sun Microsystems 
and Yahoo’s blogging policies). 
149 See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (identifying the public policy reasons 
lifestyle discrimination statutes were passed). 
150 See Yamada, supra note 139, at 49.  The policies that support free speech serve an 
important function: 
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protecting an employee’s lawful off-duty activities similarly support 
protecting an employee’s blogging activities; however, blogging 
inherently has two components, the act of having and maintaining a blog 
and the speech written within the blog.151  The problem of potentially 
protecting only the lawful off-duty activity of blogging, while not 
protecting the blogger’s speech, creates a loophole for employers who 
wish to discriminate against bloggers.152  The loophole must be closed in 
order for lifestyle discrimination statutes to satisfy their intended 
purpose:  to keep employers from controlling employees’ lawful off-duty 
activities.153  Otherwise, without protecting a blogger’s speech, the 
activity of blogging is left virtually without protection, which is 
counterintuitive of the policies supporting lifestyle discrimination 
statutes.154  Courts have taken a deferential position to employers when 
it comes to carving out public policy exceptions to the employment-at-
                                                                                                             
it would encourage ‘‘discovering the truth, through exposure to all the 
facts, open discussion, and testing of opinions.’’  Second, it would 
promote a participatory, democratic culture within the workplace.  
Third, the statute would help to strike a ‘‘balance between stability and 
movement’’ by allowing for a constructive, open discussion of 
employees’ grievances and suggestions.  Finally, it would nurture 
individual fulfillment by affirming the dignity of each worker.  These 
basic functions would be reflected in two broad policy objectives: (1) 
encouraging free speech and empowering workers; and (2) building a 
more productive, participatory workforce. 
Id. 
151 See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text (discussing lifestyle discrimination 
statues and the loopholes as applied to bloggers).  But see Eule & Varat, supra note 120, at 
1602 (addressing the problems that courts may have in applying First Amendment 
principles to private actor fact situations). 
The legislative adoption of a statute tethered to the First Amendment 
also leaves the judiciary strangely paralyzed in its interpretative role.  
These statutes require courts to apply the identical standard to private 
actors that is applied to public officials.  Yet, the contours of the First 
Amendment were developed in the context of protecting private actors 
against the government.  The government has no free speech rights of 
its own.  While the all-or-nothing dichotomy between public and 
private that marks the state action doctrine may be conceptually 
flawed, it does not follow that there are no differences between public 
and private actors.  The legislative leveling in these statutes denies the 
judiciary the opportunity to take account of unique redistributional 
effects. 
Id. 
152 See infra Part III.C (examining the various loopholes for employee bloggers in state 
lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
153 See infra Part III.B (discussing why legislation is needed to protect bloggers under 
lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
154 See infra Part III.C (discussing protections under current lifestyle discrimination 
statutes). 
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will doctrine.155  It is now up to the state legislatures and the political 
process to remedy and support the policies behind protecting lawful off-
duty activities, such as blogging.156   
B. Legislation is the Answer to Protecting Bloggers’ Online Speech 
Courts for too long have enhanced the inherent bias of the 
employment-at-will doctrine.157  In light of the blatant judicial decisions 
that do not recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine to protect free speech, state legislatures must step in and 
remedy what the courts have not.158  A comprehensive lifestyle 
discrimination statute protecting both the act of blogging and the speech 
within the blog would adequately protect at-will employee bloggers 
from their employers’ control while off-duty.159   
Looking back at the currently recognized public policy exceptions to 
the employment-at-will doctrine, it is unlikely that any of the public 
policy exceptions would provide protection for at-will employee 
bloggers.160  The applicability of the exception for refusing to commit an 
illegal act is limited because of the few situations in which blogging 
would a constitute refusal to commit an illegal or fraudulent act.161  
Furthermore, bloggers have no statutorily or constitutionally created 
duties related to blogging, making the application of the public policy 
                                                 
155 See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing application of the public 
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine). 
156 See Halbert, supra note 140, at 55.  There courts are uneven in interpreting public 
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Id.  Legislature enactment is the 
remedy to this problem because “courts will look to statutory law in order to determine 
whether or not they are confronting a clearly mandated public policy.”  Id. at 56.  At-will 
employee bloggers are specifically in need of protection because blogging necessarily has 
an activity component, which is the actual setting up and maintenance of a blog, and a 
speech component for the content of a blog.  Without protecting both the activity 
component and the speech component, an at-will employee blogger is left without 
protection for at least one aspect of her blog. 
157 Halbert, supra note 140, at 72.  “[T]he judicial response to the problem of first 
amendment rights is the workplace has been either to exacerbate it or to alleviate it 
tentatively and unevenly.”  Id. 
158 Yamada, supra note 139, at 35.  Mr. Yamada discusses the importance of extending free 
speech protection to all employees through statutory rather than judicial opinions.  Id.  
“The best forum for this discussion, however, is not the courtroom, but rather the 
legislature.”  Id. 
159 See infra Part IV (proposing a model lifestyle discrimination statute that would protect 
at-will employee bloggers). 
160 See supra Parts II.B.1-2. 
161 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine for refusal to commit an illegal act). 
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exception for statutory and constitutional duties not likely to apply.162  
While bloggers in some instances may expose corporate wrongdoing on 
their blogs, the whistleblower protections are not likely to cover bloggers 
who take no further steps to report the wrongdoing to officials.163  At 
first glance, the public policy exception grounded in freedom of speech 
rights would seem to be the strongest argument for bloggers to make; 
however, courts consistently deny this public policy exception or 
interfere with a private employer’s discretion in this area without a clear 
statutory mandate to the contrary.164  Leaving behind the inadequacies of 
the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, other 
public policy arguments exist for taking proactive steps, such as enacting 
legislation to deal with issues that follow the popularity of new 
technology.165 
When new technology surfaces, such as the blog, the legislature 
should be proactive instead of reactive to the legal problems.166  In order 
to be proactive in the case of at-will employee bloggers, the legislature 
must construct a lifestyle discrimination statute that would protect 
blogging as well as the speech associated with it.167  Furthermore, the fact 
that many state legislatures have passed some form of a lifestyle 
discrimination statute demonstrates a commitment to policies of giving 
employees protection in their life away from work.  However, there is a 
need to close the loopholes that fail to protect bloggers in many lifestyle 
discrimination statutes.168  If the policy behind lifestyle discrimination 
statutes is to promote tolerance of lawful, off-duty behavior and prohibit 
discrimination based on that lawful, off-duty conduct, activity, or 
speech, then to effectively promote that policy the legislature must 
eliminate the ambiguity in statutes that arguably protect either the 
                                                 
162 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (explaining the public policy exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine for statutory and constitutional duties). 
163 See notes 86-89 and accompanying text (examining the whistleblower protections 
available to employees). 
164 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (discussing the courts refusal to extend 
public policy exceptions for free speech). 
165 See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing the public policies behind 
lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
166 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the growing problems blogs are causing in 
employment relationships and the uncertainty of employment rights). 
167 Davis, supra note 138, at 16.  Ms. Davis notes that blogs have created a new set of legal 
issues and “[t]he legal community hasn’t been swift to respond, but such is the way with 
new technologies: The law will be developed only after problems arise.”  Id. 
168 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (defining what lifestyle discrimination 
statutes protect and stating that thirty states and the District of Columbia have some form 
of lifestyle discrimination statute). 
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conduct of blogging, or the speech within a blog, but not both.169  
Legislation is needed to give employers and employees a clear mandate 
of what is required in this area of employment law.170  Thus, an at-will 
employee blogger’s online speech is protected, if at all, through the 
addition of a lifestyle discrimination statute that specifically protects 
lawful off-duty speech and activities.171    
C. The Existing Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes Leave Loopholes for 
Bloggers   
Of the few states that have enacted comprehensive lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that specifically protect lawful off-duty activities, 
conduct, or speech, none adequately protect both speech and conduct.172  
Thus, an employee blogger is left in a statutory loophole that needs a 
remedy to support the policies that led the legislature to enact the 
statutes in the first place.173  This Section compares the protections 
afforded for lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech among the 
various lifestyle discrimination statutes that are currently enacted.174   
1. California 
The comprehensive lifestyle discrimination legislation in California 
has been narrowed through interpretation to only protect rights that are 
already constitutionally or statutorily recognized.175  The strength of a 
law to protect an employee’s lawful off-duty activities, in California, is 
overcome by its weakness of only providing a means of addressing 
rights that an employee already possesses.176  As such, at-will employees, 
                                                 
169 See Davis, supra note 138, at 16; see also infra Part III.C (analyzing weaknesses in state 
lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
170 Yamada, supra note 139, at 50.  Furthermore, a lifestyle discrimination statute that 
protects conduct and speech “can provide a more favorable climate for both individual and 
collective employee activity.”  Id. at 51. 
171 See infra Part IV (setting out a model lifestyle discrimination statute to close the 
loophole for at-will employee bloggers). 
172 See infra Parts III.C.1-5 (analyzing individual state’s lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
173 Yamada, supra note 139, at 49. 
174 See infra Parts III.C.1-5 (examining California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and 
North Dakota’s lifestyle discrimination statutes and the loopholes in each as applied to at-
will employee bloggers). 
175 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (explaining California’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute). 
176 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (discussing the effectiveness of the statute with 
regard to lawfully blogging employees).  The employees that are working at-will least 
benefit from a law that only protects established constitutional or statutory rights.  Leaving 
them with very little, if any, established constitutional or statutory rights.  See supra Part 
II.B (discussing the employment-at-will doctrine). 
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without constitutional or statutory protection for freedom of speech, are 
not adequately protected under California’s law when engaging in 
lawful off-duty blogging.177  Expanding the statute to include lawful off-
duty activities that specifically include protection for off-duty speech 
would better support at-will employees who blog under California’s 
statute.178   
2. Colorado  
Likewise, Colorado’s statutory protection for an employee’s off-duty 
conduct has been narrowly interpreted.179  For instance, this narrow 
interpretation leaves Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute unable to 
protect an employee’s letters to a newspaper editor if the employer is 
able to claim that the letter had nothing to do with a matter of public 
concern.180  This interpretation would lend an analogy to bloggers 
engaged in the activity of lawful off-duty blogging on their own 
equipment, in which the employer is able to get around the statutory 
protection by claiming that the blog did not address matters of public 
concern.181  The drawback for bloggers under the Colorado law is two-
fold.182  First, the law only protects current employees, thus applicants 
are not protected against discrimination.183  Under the Colorado law, 
employers are presumably free to discriminate among applicants 
                                                 
177 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting “that the existing legal framework 
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in 
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also William A. 
Clineburg, Jr. & Peter N. Hall, Addressing Blogging By Employees, NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2005, 
available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/nlfblogging.pdf (discussing private sector 
employees rights when blogging). 
Unfortunately, the protection that immediately suggests itself to most 
bloggers—the First Amendment—is in actuality no protection at all for 
most of them.  Employees of state and federal governments may be 
protected by the First Amendment if they are opining on a matter of 
public concern.  But private-sector employees do not enjoy the same 
protection. 
Clineburg & Hall, supra. 
178 See supra Part III.B (discussing the need for lifestyle discrimination legislation to 
protect employee bloggers). 
179 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow interpretation of 
Colorado’s statute). 
180 See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997); supra notes 
114-18 and accompanying text (explaining Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute). 
181 See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997). 
182 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute). 
183 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1100; Rives, supra note 100, at 559. 
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because of the applicant’s blogging activities.184  Second, while the law 
would likely protect the activity of blogging, it does not necessarily 
protect the blogger’s online speech.185  As such, under the Colorado law, 
in order to protect at-will employee bloggers’ activity and speech, there 
is a need to expand the scope of the law to create specific protection for 
the activity of blogging, as well as the speech that necessarily 
accompanies it.186   
3. Connecticut  
Unlike Colorado’s statute which protects activities but not speech, 
Connecticut’s lifestyle discrimination statute protections speech, but not 
activities.187  Connecticut’s statutory weakness is that it does not protect 
any lawful off-duty activities, including the activity of blogging.188  An 
additional weakness lies in that the statute only grants protection to the 
same extent that public sector employees have protection under the First 
Amendment.189  As such, only matters that deal with public concern 
would be protected, greatly narrowing the protected subject matter of a 
private sector, at-will employee’s blog.190  Thus, in order to better protect 
at-will employee bloggers, under the Connecticut statute, there is a need 
to expand the protections beyond the parallel protection of the First 
Amendment freedoms public sector employees enjoy, and to include 
protection for lawful, off-duty activities.191  Adding protection for lawful 
off-duty activities, as well as additional speech protections beyond First 
                                                 
184 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001) (defining the unlawful practice to only 
include “terminating the employment of any employee”). 
185 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting, “that the existing legal framework 
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in 
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also Clineburg & Hall, 
supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees rights when blogging). 
186 See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (discussing the need for legislation to 
protect an employee blogger’s online speech). 
187 See supra note 119 (quoting Connecticut’s statute). 
188 See Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 670 (summarizing the statute’s protection “only 
where a private employee is expressing concern about a public matter will the Connecticut 
statute protect against adverse employment action”). 
189 See supra notes 119-21 (discussing the protections of Connecticut’s statute).  Public 
sector employees are only protected if their speech reflects a matter of public concern.  As 
such, at-will employee bloggers who blog about other issues are not protected if their blog 
is not deemed to be a matter of public concern. 
190 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (discussing a matter of public concern 
as, “relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”); supra 
note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for public employee’s free 
speech protection). 
191 See supra Part III.C (discussing the need to create legislation that would adequately 
protect employee bloggers). 
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Amendment freedoms would still, under the Connecticut law, protect 
the employer’s interest when the subject matter substantially or 
materially interferes with the workplace.192   
4. New York  
Under New York’s lifestyle discrimination statutory scheme, 
protection is extended to lawful recreational activities, which would 
most likely cover off-duty blogging on the employee’s own equipment as 
a recreational activity such as a hobby.193  The weakness in the New York 
statute is the inherent vagueness and ambiguity in categorizing those 
activities that are recreational activities.194  This ambiguity may give 
employers an argument that blogging should not be considered a 
recreational activity.195  Additionally, New York courts have narrowly 
interpreted the definition of what is protected as a recreational activity, 
which may signal the likely acceptance of an argument not to protect 
blogging as a recreational activity.196  The disagreement among people as 
to how to define a blog creates more uncertainty because there is little 
concrete guidance for the courts to look to in making a determination as 
to whether blogging is a recreational activity.197  While a statute that 
protects all lawful off-duty activities and its accompanying speech 
would certainly protect bloggers, only protecting recreational activities 
without specific speech protections does not necessarily lead to that 
conclusion.198  Even if bloggers were protected under New York’s 
recreational activity definition, the speech aspect of blogging would not 
be protected.199  In order to afford protection to New York’s at-will 
                                                 
192 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (explaining Connecticut’s statute). 
193 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1102. 
194 See supra note 123 (defining recreational activities under New York’s statute). 
195 Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 654.  Ms. Pagnattaro notes that political activity cases are 
straight forward and relatively clear to categorize, but recreational activities, of which the 
most litigation has been over personal relationships, created “an early division of opinion 
between the state and fedral courts in New York.”  Id.  See also State v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding dating relationship was not a 
recreational activity).  Thus, the ambiguity in defining a recreational activity “leaves a large 
hole in its protection of employee privacy.”  Rives, supra note 100, at 563. 
196 See, e.g., State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) 
(limiting “the statutory protection to certain clearly defined categories of leisure-time 
activities”). 
197 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement among 
authors as to the definition and purpose a blog). 
198 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s statute and the 
activities to which  it applies). 
199 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002); Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 
(noting “that the existing legal framework generally provides very little protection to those 
employees that seek to engage in conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty 
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employee bloggers, there is a need to protect the speech within a blog 
and the activity of blogging within the purview of defined recreational 
activities or more generally within lawful, off-duty activities.200  
5. North Dakota  
North Dakota’s effort to remedy discrimination of lawful off-duty 
activities was enacted as part of the state’s anti-discrimination and 
human rights statutory provisions.201  The weakness in this statute is the 
uncertainty as to exactly which lawful activities will be afforded 
protection and which will not because of an exception or narrow 
interpretation of the statute.202  Assuming blogging is done off-duty, 
lawfully, and off the employer’s premises, the North Dakota law would 
seemingly afford broad protection to at-will employee bloggers, unless 
the blogging was in direct conflict with an essential business related 
interest of the employer.203  However, an at-will employee’s speech 
within the blog would not be adequately protected under the North 
Dakota law, primarily because the speech could be considered a separate 
aspect of the blogging activities.204   
Employment law’s jurisprudential future is best served with an eye 
toward anticipating the legal issues blogs present in this arena.  Thus, 
protecting at-will employees’ lawful, off-duty activities or conduct and 
the speech associated with it, would necessarily encompass blogging and 
provide certainty and uniformity within employment law where the 
public policy exceptions to the judicially enforced employment-at-will 
doctrine and the loopholes of the legislatively enacted lifestyle 
discrimination statutes have not.205   
                                                                                                             
time”); see also Clineburg & Hall, supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees rights 
when blogging). 
200 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (explaining the need to proactively 
legislate to protect at-will employee bloggers under lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
201 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (explaining North Dakota’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute). 
202 Rives, supra note 100, at 561 (noting the ambiguous language of the statute gives 
employers little guidance as to what activities an employee can and cannot be fired for). 
203 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (explaining North Dakota’s lifestyle 
discrimination statute). 
204 Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting, “that the existing legal framework 
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in 
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also Clineburg & Hall, 
supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees’ rights when blogging). 
205 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (explaining the need for lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that protect speech as well as conduct or activities). 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Protecting at-will employee bloggers’ online speech and the activity 
or conduct of having a blog is necessary to bring bloggers under the 
protection of lifestyle discrimination statutes that are aimed at protecting 
lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech.206  Language providing 
protection for the speech associated with lawful off-duty activities or 
conduct is the crucial element that the current lifestyle discrimination 
statutory language is lacking in order to protect at-will employee 
bloggers.207  Without protection for a blogger’s speech, the activity of 
having and maintaining a blog is not adequately protected under the 
current lifestyle discrimination statutes aimed at protecting lawful off-
duty activities or conduct.208  The policy of protecting an employee’s 
lawful off-duty activities and conduct is advanced when legislatures 
protect the speech associated with the activities or conduct, such as 
protecting an employee blogger’s speech.209  This Note proposes the 
following model lifestyle discrimination statute with the additional 
protections for speech associated with lawful off-duty activities or 
conduct.210   
A. Proposed Model Comprehensive Lifestyle Discrimination Statute211 
The following model lifestyle discrimination statute proposes a way 
to advance the policies behind lifestyle discrimination legislation.212  
                                                 
206 See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (examining lifestyle discrimination statutes that have a 
loophole in which at-will employee bloggers could slip through without protection). 
207 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing the need to enact lifestyle 
discrimination legislation to protect lawful off-duty activities and conduct as well as the 
speech that is associated with such activities). 
208 See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (discussing the loopholes in the current lifestyle 
discrimination statutes). 
209 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing the policy reasons behind 
lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect lawful off duty activities). 
210 See infra Part IV.A (providing protection for lawful off-duty conduct, activities, or 
speech).  By protecting the speech that is associated with the lawful off-duty conduct or 
activity an employee blogger’s speech is adequately protected because a bloggers speech in 
necessarily associated with the activity of blogging. 
211 This model lifestyle discrimination statute is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 
(2001) (defining as an unlawful employment practice the prohibition of legal activities as a 
condition of employment).  The writing that is struck through indicates portions of the 
Colorado statute that the author would take out.  The proposed additional protections are 
italicized and are the contributions of the author. 
212 See supra Part III (explaining the need for the legislature to enact a comprehensive 
lifestyle discrimination statute in order to adequately protect at-will employees because of 
the deference courts give to employers and the courts’ unwillingness to carve out 
additional public policy exceptions). 
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Additionally, this proposed model statute would protect employee 
bloggers’ lawful off-duty activities or the conduct of having and 
maintaining a blog and the speech associated with the blog.213   
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for 
any employer to refuse to hire an applicant, demote, or to terminate 
the employment of any employee, or to fail or refuse to promote or  
upgrade an employee, due to that applicant’s or employee’s 
engaging in any lawful activity or conduct or speech associated with 
the protected activity or conduct when done off the premises of the 
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction:  
a. Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is 
reasonably and rationally related to the employment 
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a 
particular group of employees, rather than to all employees 
of the employer; or 
b. Is necessary to avoid a bona fide and actual conflict of interest 
with any responsibilities of the employer or the appearance 
of such a conflict of interest.   
Commentary  
The proposed model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute 
makes clear that it is applicable to all employers.214  Additionally, the 
proposed model statute protects applicants and employees.215  This 
protection serves to protect applicants from discrimination for their 
lawful online blogging activities and the speech associated with those 
activities.  Likewise, it also protects employees from discrimination for 
their lawful off-duty online blogging activities or speech associated with 
those activities.  The statute extends protection to employees not only 
from adverse firings, but also from discrimination in promotions or 
upgrades.216  The statute specifically protects only those activities that 
are done lawfully, off-duty, and away from the employer’s premises.217  
                                                 
213 See infra text accompanying § (1) (expanding protection for lawful off-duty activities 
or conduct and the speech associated with such conduct). 
214 See supra text accompanying § 1 (extending statutory coverage to any employer). 
215 See supra text accompanying § 1 (extending statutory protection to applicants for hire). 
216 See supra text accompanying § 1 (protecting employees from adverse firings and 
failure to promote or upgrade). 
217 The reasoning behind having the statutory protection extend only to activities or 
conduct that is done off the employer’s premises is to take potential claims out of the realm 
of being done on company time.  Furthermore, other adequate protections govern activities 
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The amendment to the conflict of interest section takes the ambiguity out 
of what may create an “appearance of a conflict of interest” by only 
excluding from statutory protection actual, established conflicts of 
interest.218  Employee bloggers will benefit from the actual conflict of 
interest requirement because it forces the employer to show an actual 
conflict of interest created by the employee’s blog.219   
(2) The rights defined in § (1) are the individual rights of the applicant or 
employee, and are independent of, and not dependant on any other 
rights of the applicant or employee.   
Commentary  
Additionally, the proposed model statute makes clear that the rights 
protected under the statute are independent of any other rights already 
held by the applicant or employee.220  This statutory language is 
important to protect an at-will employee blogger’s speech because it 
discredits any argument that the speech protected is dependant on only 
that speech which would be protected by the federal or a state 
constitution.221  Furthermore, this protection serves to eliminate the 
possibility that statutory interpretation would narrow the scope of 
protection to only those rights, if any, which are already substantively 
recognized for employee bloggers.222   
                                                                                                             
done on the employer’s property and during company time like the federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, which is outside the scope of this Note.  The essence of 
lifestyle discrimination statutes is adherence to the limitation that the activity, conduct, or 
speech is done off-duty. 
218 See supra § (1)(b); see also supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing 
Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute). 
219 See supra § (1)(b) (creating the necessity for an employer to show an actual conflict of 
interest). 
220 See supra § (2).  This addition in the statute is intended to remedy the potential for 
judicial interpretation to characterize the statute as remedial protection for rights that an 
employee already has; see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing 
California’s lifestyle discrimination statute and its narrow interpretation). 
221 See supra § (2).  This text alleviates the potential of having a narrow interpretation of 
the statute, like the narrow view adopted for California’s lifestyle discrimination statute.  
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing California’s Attorney General 
opinion that narrowed the potential scope of the California lifestyle discrimination statute). 
222 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow scope of 
California’s lifestyle discrimination statute).  By clearly indicating that the statute is 
creating new substantive rights for employees, the possibility that interpretation would 
narrow the use of the statute to only a procedural mechanism for protecting already 
existing rights is eliminated.  There is a need for this clarity because the possibility of such 
an interpretation would leave blogging employees without protection for their speech 
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(3) The remedy for any person claiming to be aggrieved under § (1) by a 
discriminatory or unfair employment practice as defined in § (1) shall 
be as follows: He may bring a civil suit for damages in any state 
court of competent jurisdiction and may sue for all wages and 
benefits which would have been due him up to and including 
the date of judgment had the discriminatory or unfair 
employment practice not occurred; except that nothing in this 
section shall be construed as to relieve such person from the 
obligation to mitigate his damages.223   
(4) The court shall award the prevailing party any person claiming to 
be aggrieved under § (1) court costs and a reasonable attorney fee if 
that person prevails in his cause of action under § (1).224   
Commentary  
The statute also provides an independent right of action for 
applicants and employees to enforce these rights for remedies under civil 
law.225  This protection serves to avoid litigation over whether the statute 
provides for a private right of action.  Finally, only those persons 
claiming to be aggrieved as applicants or employees are permitted 
awards of attorney fees or court costs.226  Providing attorney’s fees only 
to prevailing applicants or employees is designed to avoid the chilling 
effect from the possibility of paying the employer’s attorneys fees.   
B.  The Untangling Legal Effect of the Model Lifestyle Discrimination Statute  
The proposed model lifestyle discrimination statute adopts statutory 
language that is typical of many of the state statutes that protect lawful 
off-duty activities of employees.227  Like many of the existing 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes, the proposal provides 
                                                                                                             
associated with lawful off-duty activities.  See also supra Part III.C (discussing lifestyles 
discrimination statutory loopholes as applied to bloggers). 
223 The non-italicized statutory wording in this section is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402.5(2)(a) (2001).  The masculine is used here as it is in the Colorado statute; however, it 
applies equally to female and male applicants or employees. 
224 The non-italicized statutory wording in this section is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402.5(2)(b) (2001). 
225 See supra text accompanying § 3. 
226 See supra text accompanying § 4.  The provision only providing for the possibility of 
awarding attorney fees and court costs to aggrieved parties is to eliminate the possible 
chilling effect that allowing the “prevailing party” to collect may have on potential 
claimants. 
227 See supra Part II.C (discussing the statutory text of the currently existing 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/8
2007] Untangling the World Wide Weblog 289 
protection for lawful off-duty activities and conduct, but goes further to 
provide protection for the speech that is associated with those activities 
or conduct.228  The loopholes found in many of the existing lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that could be used to prevent statutory protection 
for bloggers are closed by protecting the speech that is associated with 
the lawful off-duty activity or conduct.229  The proposed model 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute not only proposes the 
additional protection for speech associated with the lawful off-duty 
activities or conduct, but also seeks to overcome other statutory 
weaknesses found in many of the existing state statutes.230 
The proposed model lifestyle discrimination statute serves to create 
rights for all applicants and employees engaging in lawful off-duty 
activities or conduct and provides protection for the speech associated 
with the protected activities or conduct.  The particular additional speech 
protection is important for all employees, but particularly at-will 
employee bloggers.  Taken together, the provisions in the model statute 
serve to give at-will employee bloggers protection for having and 
maintaining a blog and the speech associated with their blog when it is 
done lawfully, on their own time, and away from the employer’s 
premises.  The off-duty and off-premises mandates allow employers to 
have the necessary, requisite control in the employment relationship 
during working hours, while giving employees the freedom to have a 
life away from work and the ability to participate in activities like 
blogging. 
Protecting employee bloggers’ speech associated with blogging is 
meant to remedy the loophole created in some state lifestyle 
discrimination statutes that already protect employees’ lawful off-duty 
activities or conduct.  It also serves to give clear guidance in this area of 
employment law jurisprudence.  This proactive measure seeks to 
advance the policies behind lifestyle discrimination statutes, which 
recognize that the employment-at-will doctrine does not always 
adequately protect an employee’s right to a life away from work.  This 
model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute attempts to do 
away with the injustice created with the possibility that the dichotomy of 
                                                 
228 See supra § 1 and accompanying text (adding the additional protection for speech 
associated with lawful off-duty activities or conduct). 
229 See supra Part III.C (discussing the loopholes in existing lifestyle discrimination 
statutes that leave at-will employee bloggers without protection). 
230 See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (discussing the current lifestyle discrimination statutes’ 
weaknesses and loopholes). 
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a blogger’s activity of having and maintaining a blog being treated 
differently than the blogger’s speech within the blog. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Legislation that protects an employee’s lawful off-duty activities and 
the speech that is associated with those activities bridges the gap in at-
will employee protection where the judicial decisions of the 
employment-at-will doctrine and current lifestyle discrimination statutes 
fall short.  Protecting employee’s rights serves to counterbalance the 
employment-at-will doctrine’s harsh effects.  Currently, lifestyle 
discrimination statutes seek to provide protection for lawful off-duty 
conduct, activities or speech; however, no statutes adequately combine 
the protection in such a way as to bring at-will employee bloggers under 
the statutory protection.  At-will employee bloggers escape protection 
under the current lifestyle discrimination statutes because either a statute 
only protects activity or conduct, but does not adequately protect the 
employee blogger’s speech, or the statute only protects speech, but 
leaves the activity or conduct of blogging unprotected.  This is not the 
correct outcome for legislation intended to further employee rights by 
creating a wall against which an employer’s pervasive hand cannot 
reach.  A comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute protecting 
lawful off-duty conduct or activities and the speech associated with it 
provides clear guidance to the courts, employers, and employees as to 
employees’ rights away from work, particularly while blogging.  A 
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute that adequately protects 
bloggers will help reduce the number of unsuspecting dooced 
employees, because it gives certainty to at-will employee bloggers who 
are currently trapped in a world wide web of unresolved employment 
law legal issues. 
Shelbie J. Byers231 
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